Question

企业管理运筹学题目

Question 2(6 points): A firm owns a production process that generates gross revenue, where is the amount of effort the manager (whom the firm needs to hire to generate such revenue) puts in and is a random variable with mean zero and variance of . The manager is risk averse and his expected utility, given his wage and effort level, is equal to . Assume the manager’s reservation utility is equal to zero. The timeline is as follows: first, the firm offers the manager a compensation contract . Then the manager either accepts or rejects it. If the manager a rejects the contract, he earns his reservation utility of zero and the firm receives zero profit. If he accept the contract , he chooses the effort level and the firm’s profit is equal to . The firm’s owners are risk neutral and they want to maximize the expected profit.
1)(1 point) If the effort level is observable and contractible (i.e., can depend on ), what will be the equilibrium effort level? Describe the corresponding incentive contract in details (i.e, provide the exact formula for such wage function ). Note that such effort level is also called “first-best” or “socially optimal” effort level.
2)Now, assume that the effort level is not observable but the gross revenue is. Assume also we are limited to a linear incentive contracts is described by two parameters: and .
2a) (3 points) Find the optimal incentive contract and the equilibrium effort level.
2b) (0.5 points) Did you find a SPNE or just NE? Answer this question even if you were not able to answer part 2a.
2c)(0.5 points) How the equilibrium effort level depends (i.e., increase, does not change, or mixed dependence) on the risk of the project ? What happens when converges to zero? What happens when converges

Answer 1

不可以，主营业务成本是指销售的产品的库存成本。对于工业企业来说，就是产成品库存的发出成本（按先进先出、加权平均等方法计算有所不同）。产成品成本包括材料成本、直接人工成本、制造费等间接成本。所以仅仅填列材料成本会严重低估成本、虚增利润