Question

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Principal-agent problems lengthen recognition lags and decision lags for deposit insurers
and create incentives to understate the fund's exposure to losses. Tandem information
asymmetries exist between deposit institutions and their regulators and among regulators,
politicians, and taxpayers.
These information asymmetries are most severe for innovative forms of risk-taking.
Client firms' opportunities to conceal risk-taking strategies and losses from their insurer
increase with the volatility of the financial environment and with the rate of change in
financial technology. During the last 25 years, a proliferation of new financial instruments
and a rapid development of new financial technologies have made it possible for aggressive
managers of insured institutions to expose state and federal deposit-insurance funds to a
number of hard-to-understand risks (see Kane, 1985, ch. 5).
These environmental changes increased client risk exposure and interacted with
weaknesses in historical-cost accounting to increase insured institutions' concealment
capacities, too. During the period when aggressive S&L managers could conceal from
FSLIC monitors their accumulating losses and the costs that their strategies were imposing
on the insurance fund, a massive capital shortage may be said in part to have sneaked up
on deposit insurance managers. This sneak attack victimized not only the managers of
FSLIC but also the managers of several state-sponsored deposit insurance schemes.

Answer 1

Principal-agent problems lengthen recognition lags and decision lags for deposit insurers
and create incentives to understate the fund's exposure to losses. Tandem information
asymmetries exist between deposit institutions and their regulators and among regulators,
politicians, and taxpayers.
These information asymmetries are most severe for innovative forms of risk-taking.
Client firms' opportunities to conceal risk-taking strategies and losses from their insurer
increase with the volatility of the financial environment and with the rate of change in
financial technology. During the last 25 years, a proliferation of new financial instruments
and a rapid development of new financial technologies have made it possible for aggressive
managers of insured institutions to expose state and federal deposit-insurance funds to a
number of hard-to-understand risks (see Kane, 1985, ch. 5).
These environmental changes increased client risk exposure and interacted with
weakn
委托代理问题延长承认落后和决策滞后存款保险公司

并建立奖励低估了基金的风险损失。串联信息

之间存在着不对称存款机构及其监管机构和监管机构，

政治家和纳税人。

这些信息不对称是最严重的创新形式的风险承担。

客户公司的机会来掩盖冒险战略和损失的保险

随着动荡的金融环境和速度的变化

金融技术。在过去的25年里，扩散的新的金融工具

和快速发展新的金融技术使得侵略性

管理人员的保险机构，揭露州和联邦存款保险基金以

一些很难理解的风险（见凯恩， 1985年，总。 5 ） 。

These environmental changes increased client risk exposure and interacted with
weaknesses in historical-cost accounting to increase insured institutions' concealment
capacities, too. During the period when aggressive S&L managers could conceal from
FSLIC monitors their accumulating losses and the costs that their strategies were imposing
on the insurance fund, a massive capital shortage may be said in part to have sneaked up
on deposit insurance managers. This sneak attack victimized not only the managers of
FSLIC but also the managers of several state-sponsored deposit insurance schemes
这些环境的变化增加了客户风险并同

弱点历史成本会计，提高保险机构的隐瞒

能力，也。期间侵略县及L经理可以隐瞒

FSLIC监测其累积损失和费用，他们的战略实施

关于保险资金，大规模的资本短缺可以说是为了潜入行动

关于存款保险经理。这偷袭不仅害的管理者

FSLIC而且管理人员的几个国家支持的存款保险计划