Question

急求英语翻译！不要网页上的直译啊！翻译的好我加分！谢谢了！

A transfer of risk responsibility from the insurer, to all those impacted by flood will not take place until the insurance industry addresses a number of issues. First, there has traditionally been no link between flood risk and insurance premium (except in a few cases), but since 2001 there has been a move towards a more competitive but more closely risk-based approach to pricing. Mitigation is key and a sensible alternative to continued insurance for repeatedly flooded properties, e.g. flood-proofing or compensation should be considered. Second, flood cover is included as part of the standard comprehensive household insurance and unless it is decoupled (e.g. with an excess as with subsidence cover, or as a separate policy) its significance will not be realised by the insured property owner. This is problematic however, as although awareness of the issue would be raised by a decoupling of the flood insurance, this measure might also create some negative consequences. Unless, flood insurance was made compulsory there may be a reduction in uptake of this insurance.
In addition, the separation of flood insurance from the bundled policy would also increase the administration and transaction costs of insurers. Third, the process of seeking and gaining insurance also buffers the public from the reality of risk. For example, block insurance (e.g. insurance bought through the mortgage provider) and insurance purchased by the owner of rented property all serve to promote remoteness to the contents of the insurance policy.
Market incentives, as Natsios suggests, are possibly the most effective way of changing social behaviour. Thus, flood insurers could play a critical role in risk reduction and avoidance via the use of financial (dis)incentives:
Kunreuther suggests that, before a disaster, affected parties tend not to adopt measures to reduce potential losses from a future event. The use of financial incentives enables the first step away from reaction and a curing of symptoms and towards prevention or at least a decrease in risk (pro-action after one flood and before the next), rather than continual reaction after each flood. Mitigation measures also provide the important role of general awareness-raising, which in turn can enable further risk reduction. The utilisation of such tools encourages the house owner to engage with the risk of flood. For example, the use of no-claims bonuses would ensure that insurers were relieved of a large number of small losses (more easily rectified by the client). However, the disincentive of potential flood damage costs to the client would also ensure that they are more prepared to take measures to minimise losses themselves.

Answer 1

一个转移的风险责任由保险人,所有那些受洪水不会发生到保险行业中的若干问题提出了一种。首先,历来防洪风险之间没有联系(除了和保险费少数病例),但自2001年以来已经有一个走向更激烈的竞争,但更紧密的风险方法进行定价。关键是,一个明智减灾选择继续保险,如反复淹性质或补偿应考虑。第二,洪水的封面是包括标准的综合家居保险,除非它是解耦(例如以作为与沉降盖,或为一个独立的政策),其意义并不会意识到,被保险人财产所有者。这是有问题的,然而尽管对这个问题会引发了洪水保险、解耦控制措施也会产生一些负面影响。除非,洪水保险是义务有可能减少摄取的保险。
此外,分离的洪水保险从捆绑政策也会增加了交易成本的管理和保险公司。第三,过程中寻找并获得保险也缓冲器公众的真实的风险。例如,通过保险(如保险购买抵押贷款提供商)和保险购买的所有财产都以促进租用偏远的内容的保险单。
他建议,为市场激励,可能是最有效的方式变化的社会行为。因此,洪水保险公司可能起着至关重要的作用,在风险减少和避免通过金融(德)激励。
Kunreuther表明,灾前,受影响的当事人不采取措施来减少潜在未来事件造成的损失。使用财政刺激使第一步远离反应和养护的症状和预防或至少降低风险(活动前后的洪水和前下),而非连续反应后的洪水。缓解措施也提供了重要的角色,而这也就会反过来一般旨在进一步减少风险能使。使用这些工具鼓励的房子主人的风险。例如,使用没有索赔奖金将保证保险公司被解除了大量的小的损失(更容易纠正客户)。然而,这个障碍的潜在客户的洪水灾害成本也会使他们更有准备采取措施减少损失。

Answer 2

风险责任由保险人转移，所有受洪水影响的人将不会发生，直到保险业解决了一些问题。首先，传统上一直没有与洪水风险和保险费的联系（除少数情况下），但自2001年以来出现了发展为更具竞争力，但更密切的风险为基础的定价的做法。
减灾是关键，一个明智的选择，因多次洪水保险属性，以继续，如防汛或补偿，应考虑。二，洪水覆盖被列为标准的综合家居保险的一部分，除非它解耦（带有与下沉覆盖，或过多例如，作为一个单独的坡
licy），其意义无法实现的保险财产的所有者。然而，这是有问题的，但这一问题将是由洪水保险脱钩提高认识，这项措施也可能产生一些消极后果。除非，洪水保险是一项强制措施有可能会在本保险的吸收减少。
此外，洪水保险的捆绑政策分离还会增加管理和保险人的交易成本。第三，寻求并获得保险的进程也缓冲区从风险的现实情况。例如，综合保险（例如
购买保险，通过抵押贷款提供商）和租用物业业主购买的所有有利于促进偏远的保险政策的内容保险。
市场激励措施，如纳齐奥斯建议，是改变社会行为可能是最有效的方法。因此，洪水保险可以发挥减少风险，并通过金融（存使用）奖励避免关键作用：
孔鲁建议，在一场灾难，受影响的各方往往不采取措施，以减少将来发生的事件可能造成的损失。在使用财政奖励办法的第一步，使远离反应和治疗症状和预防的或至少是减少风险（亲行动洪水后，一前下）
持续反应，而不是在每次洪水。缓解措施还规定了重要作用的认识提高，这反过来可以使进一步降低风险。这种工具的使用，鼓励屋主进行同洪水的危险。例如，无索赔的奖金将确保保险人的钐大量放心使用
所有损失（更容易被客户纠正）。然而，潜在的成本不利因素洪灾给客户端也将确保他们更愿意采取措施，以减少自己的损失。