Question

帮忙翻译，谢谢。

Abstract：Chinese listed firms have gained the world’s attention with several ambitious,high-profile cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In most of these deals,the Chinese government is the largest shareholder of the acquiring firms.As such,it may be the case that the Chinese government pushes through such deals even though they are not in the best interests of minority shareholders, giving rise to principal–principal conflicts.Along these lines,we hypothesize that increased government ownership in the acquiring firm will be associated with investors viewing a cross-border merger deal in less favorable terms.In addition,we hypothesize that environmental complexity will moderate this negative relationship.We test our hypotheses with a sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008. We find support for the main hypothesis,that is,that investors are indeed skeptical of cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals when the government is the majority owner(i.e.,principal–principal conflicts).However,we find no support for the moderating effect. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners and suggest future research directions.listed companies: A principal–principal perspective

Answer 1

摘要：中国上市公司获得了全世界的关注与几个雄心勃勃,举世瞩目的跨境并购。在大多数的这些协定,中国政府是世界上最大的股东收购公司同样地,它也有可能是,中国政府将通过这样的交易,即使他们不是在最好的小投资者的利益冲突,上升到资本加家沿着这条思路,我们假设增加政府的所有权的收购公司将与跨国并购交易的投资者在看一个优惠的条件,少…此外,我们假设环境复杂度主持这个负向关系我们假设检验和抽样调查的跨境兼并和收购中国公司从2000年到2008年。我们找到支持主要的假设,即:投资者实际上是对跨国并购交易时,政府是大多数业主(例如,资本家冲突)。然而,我们还没有找到支持的干扰效果。我们讨论这些研究人员和专业人员和建议今后的研究方向.列出公司:资本家的
视角。