Question

求翻译在线等

This paper shows, in contrast, that the employer may matter, and that the informal arguments made in favour of government provision in the public administration literature do have economic merit. Consider the problem facing a social planner who wants to ensure provision of a valuable social service. The planner chooses between setting up a government department, which has a bureaucrat hired to oversee government employees, or writing a contract with a private firm to provide the service. The main distinction between a contract with a private firm and the incentive structure in a bureaucracy is that the firm’s owner is a residual claimant on net profit, whereas a bureaucrat in the public sector is not.Suppose all workers are endowed with PSM, and that this concern exists independently of who they work for. This is an outcome-oriented motivation so the workers do not care who provides the service, and do not get utility from the very act of providing it, rather they only care about the level of service. For PSM to motivate a worker’s own effort, the worker must believe that, were she not to provide the effort, the level of service would fall. The important thing then is for the employer (either the government bureaucrat or residual claimant in the private firm) to credibly commit not to make up for any shirking by adjusting other inputs. When this commitment is credible, the worker will not shirk since she knows shirking affects output. The private firm cannot credibly commit because once shirking occurs, profits will be lost if it does not adapt and the contract with the planner is unfulfilled. The government bureaucrat, however, with no residual claim on profits, does not face a similar incentive. Under a range of conditions, which are established in the paper, the bureaucrat can commit not to adapt, so that government workers are motivated by PSM not to shirk even though workers in a private firm would not be.
Under these conditions, a government department provides the service at strictly lower cost than a profit-maximizing firm operating under contract with the planner.The analysis bears some similarity to a number of different theories that argue a case for public provision and it is worth considering these distinctions before proceeding.
Psychologists have noted that the perceived nature of a relationship affects individual motivations. Consequently, some argue that civic virtues can be crowded out when services provided as gifts are then provided under contract. In particular, Gregory (1999), Frey (1997a,b) and Nowland-Foreman (1998) argue that the form of contracting in the public sector affects individuals’ norms. When contracts treat agents as if they were self-serving, they then become so. Here, in contrast, the level of PSM in the population is assumed to be unchanged by the form of contracting and service provision.
Preferences of all agents are identical whether working for a private firm or government, and all individuals are homogeneous. This also contrasts the present paper with work examining adverse selection problems that arise when individuals differ in their degree of altruistic motivation, see Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) in Rose-Ackerman (1986).
不要软件翻译谢谢！！！

Answer 1

本文表明，与此相反，雇主可能会起作用，而且那些公共管理方面上支持政府提供服务的非正式论据确实具有经济价值。考虑一下一个社会规划者当他想保证政府能够提供有社会价值的服务时所面临的问题。策划者可以在两个选项中选择：设立一个政府部门，需要聘请官僚以监督政府雇员，或与一私人公司签订合同，使其提供服务。与私人公司签订合同和官僚系统激励结构的主要区别在于，公司的所有人拥有对净利润剩余的索取权，而在公共部门的官僚并不拥有。假设所有员工都会被PSM激励，而不论他们为谁工作。这是一种结果导向的激励，所以员工不会考虑服务由谁提供，也无法从这种行为得到实际效用，他们关心的只是服务水平。为了PSM激发工人的自身努力，工人必须相信一个前提：如果她不提供努力，整体服务水平将会下降。然后重要的一点则是雇主（无论是政府官僚或私营公司的剩余索取者）郑重承诺不会调整其他投入以弥补收入欠缺。当这个承诺是可信的时，工人不会减少自身对工作的投入，因为她知道减少自身投入会减少产出的服务。私营公司不能给出令人信服的承诺，因为一旦发生利润缩减，如果不调整，与规划者的合同将无法兑现。然而政府官僚由于没有对利润的剩余索取权则不会面临类似的困境。在本文所讨论的条件下，政府官僚可以承诺不因利润减少而降低服务水平，所以政府工作人员会被PSM机制所激励，这一点在私人公司则不会发生。在这些条件下，政府部门提供的服务价格会严格控制在一个较低的区间，而与规划着签订合约的、追求利润最大化的企业则不能。本文的分析和一些研究政府提供服务的不同理论有一些相似之处，但在研究之前有必要考虑这些的区别。
心理学家指出，一段关系的知觉性质会影响个人激励。因此，有些人认为如果公共服务不是作为一件政府提供品而是由合约限制的，公民美德就会消失。特别是，格雷戈里（1999年），弗雷（1997年a，b）和Nowland-Foreman（1998）认为，在公共部门承包的形式影响到个人的道德规范。当合同把员工处理为理性自私的，他们就会变得如此。相反，无论承包和提供服务是什么形式，本文假设人们的PSM水平是不变的。

Answer 2

该报告显示,相比之下,雇主可能的事情,而且这种不正式的观点赞成政府规定在公共行政文学有经济的优点。考虑社会规划中所面临的问题想保证一种有用的社会服务。本刊物选择建立政府部门之间,它有一个官僚受雇监督政府雇员,或写合同的私营公司提供这项服务。主要的区别私人公司的合同,从而激励结构的官僚主义,公司老板剩余利润,而在网上填写在公共部门的官僚之外不假设所有的工人都被赋予了诗,这个问题对他们的独立存在为他踢球。”这是一个outcome-oriented动机所以工人不关心谁提供服务,而不受工具为它提供的行动,实际上,他们只关心的服务水平。为诗激发了工人师傅的自己的努力,职工必须相信这一点,如果她不提供努力,的服务水平会下跌。”重要的事,那么是用人单位(无论是政府官僚赔偿请求人或残留在私人公司)将不故障,通过调整卸责为任何其他的投入。当这种承诺是可信的,职工不会因此而推卸因为她知道逃避影响输出。私人公司不能完全将因为一旦逃避发生,利润会失去了如果它不适应和合同而本刊物是没有实现。政府官僚、但是,由于没有利润、剩余索取权没有面临类似的激励。在一系列的情况下,设立在论文中,研究官僚可以投入不去适应,使政府工作人员是出于诗不推卸即使工人的私营公司不会。

在这种情况下,政府部门提供严格的服务更低的成本一个利润最优化的公司经营下合同计划具有一些相似的分析了许多不同的理论而争论提供公共的案例,它值得考虑这些区别在进行之前。

心理学家指出,自然的关系被影响个人的动机。因此,一些人争辩说公民道德可以挤出来提供服务时作为礼物,然后下提供合同。特别是,格瑞戈尔(1999),所以弗雷(1997a,b)和Nowland-Foreman(1998)认为合同的形式在公共部门的影响个人的规范。当合同治疗的代理,如果他们自私的,他们就会这样。在这里,相比之下,水平的诗在人群中,也都假设是不变的形式的合同和服务条款。

问题补充:

对所有因子是相同的工作是否一家私营公司或政府,而每个人都均匀。这也是本文对比研究逆向选择问题工作时,产生个人持有不同的程度的利他动机,看Weisbrod和施莱辛格曾(1986)在Rose-Ackerman(1986)。