谁能帮我把下面几段英文翻译成简体中文,不要翻译工具!哪怕只翻译一小节也给分!尽量准确!!!尽快。。
Researchindicatesthatthereisapositiveassociationbetweenaccountingearningsandchiefexec...
Research indicates that there is a positive association between
accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation;
however, evidence also suggests that this positive
association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor
or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate
compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized
for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study
is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding
the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a
set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are
related to both current and future firm performance. Our results
indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between
accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO
bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship
between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions
and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or
declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In
contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that
the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation
is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken
together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship
between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation
(particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly
due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes
accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with
bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation
is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes
claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when
earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the
presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.
尽快吧。。。很急很急。。。 展开
accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation;
however, evidence also suggests that this positive
association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor
or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate
compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized
for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study
is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding
the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a
set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are
related to both current and future firm performance. Our results
indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between
accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO
bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship
between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions
and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or
declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In
contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that
the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation
is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken
together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship
between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation
(particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly
due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes
accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with
bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation
is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes
claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when
earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the
presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.
尽快吧。。。很急很急。。。 展开
4个回答
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Research indicates that there is a positive association between
accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation;
however, evidence also suggests that this positive
association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor
or declining.
调查研究表明,在公司盈利和CEO的报酬之间存在着正相关的关系,但是同时也有证据表明,当收入状况不佳时,这种正相关的关系却不存在;(就是公司业绩好,CEO 工资高,但是公司业绩不好的时候他们的工资却没有降低)
This latter result has led some critics of corporate
compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized
for poor or declining firm performance.
紧接着的结果就是,会有结论说,公司的薪酬制度没有反应对CEO在经营不善上的惩罚。
你很急我先发上来,后面的我一点点翻译给你
The purpose of this study
is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding
the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a
set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are
related to both current and future firm performance.
此项研究旨在进一步阐述对于将传统的奖金制度向包含有对公司目前和未来发展状况评估的绩效考核报酬模式转变的观点。
Our results
indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between
accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO
bonus compensation.
我们的研究成果还表明在公司财务状况和CEO所获得的奖金级别以及奖金级别的变化之间存在十分重大的联系。
Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship
between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions
and bonus reductions.
此外,我们还发现公司财务状况和奖金的缺失以及减少之间的联系也十分紧密。
When earnings are negative or
declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact.
当公司经营不景气或是衰退时,我们发现这之间的联系还是完全存在的。
In
contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that
the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation
is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses.
相对的,当公司经营不佳时,公司总营业额与奖金支出之间的关系十分微弱甚至没有。这一点在我们大多数的分析中都有体现。(这和上面那段是从不同角度分析的,上面是动态的比较,分析的是两个数值在变动的时候有没有联系,后面这个是静态分析,讲的是单纯看2个总数之间有没有联系)Taken
together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship
between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation
(particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly
due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes
accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with
bonus compensation.
综上所述,表面上看公司经营状况和CEO的奖金收入之间关系微弱(特别是在公司业绩不佳时)其实在一定程度上是因为奖金红利机制没有将公司经营状况这个与奖金数额有莫大关系的因素纳入其中。
Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation
is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes
claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when
earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the
presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.
因此,我们得出以下结论
1.奖金数额的多少与公司经营业绩之间的联系远比一些理论所说的多。
2.当公司业绩经营不佳时所支付给CEO的奖金红利,至少是由于美化了所呈现的财务状况而做的决定(这句不是很确定)
accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation;
however, evidence also suggests that this positive
association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor
or declining.
调查研究表明,在公司盈利和CEO的报酬之间存在着正相关的关系,但是同时也有证据表明,当收入状况不佳时,这种正相关的关系却不存在;(就是公司业绩好,CEO 工资高,但是公司业绩不好的时候他们的工资却没有降低)
This latter result has led some critics of corporate
compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized
for poor or declining firm performance.
紧接着的结果就是,会有结论说,公司的薪酬制度没有反应对CEO在经营不善上的惩罚。
你很急我先发上来,后面的我一点点翻译给你
The purpose of this study
is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding
the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a
set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are
related to both current and future firm performance.
此项研究旨在进一步阐述对于将传统的奖金制度向包含有对公司目前和未来发展状况评估的绩效考核报酬模式转变的观点。
Our results
indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between
accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO
bonus compensation.
我们的研究成果还表明在公司财务状况和CEO所获得的奖金级别以及奖金级别的变化之间存在十分重大的联系。
Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship
between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions
and bonus reductions.
此外,我们还发现公司财务状况和奖金的缺失以及减少之间的联系也十分紧密。
When earnings are negative or
declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact.
当公司经营不景气或是衰退时,我们发现这之间的联系还是完全存在的。
In
contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that
the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation
is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses.
相对的,当公司经营不佳时,公司总营业额与奖金支出之间的关系十分微弱甚至没有。这一点在我们大多数的分析中都有体现。(这和上面那段是从不同角度分析的,上面是动态的比较,分析的是两个数值在变动的时候有没有联系,后面这个是静态分析,讲的是单纯看2个总数之间有没有联系)Taken
together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship
between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation
(particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly
due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes
accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with
bonus compensation.
综上所述,表面上看公司经营状况和CEO的奖金收入之间关系微弱(特别是在公司业绩不佳时)其实在一定程度上是因为奖金红利机制没有将公司经营状况这个与奖金数额有莫大关系的因素纳入其中。
Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation
is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes
claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when
earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the
presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.
因此,我们得出以下结论
1.奖金数额的多少与公司经营业绩之间的联系远比一些理论所说的多。
2.当公司业绩经营不佳时所支付给CEO的奖金红利,至少是由于美化了所呈现的财务状况而做的决定(这句不是很确定)
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调查显示,帐户收入与CEO现金补偿之间存在正相关关系:然而,也有证据显示当收入减少时,这种正相关就不复存在了。
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看了后,觉得,我要学英语啦,忘得差不多了,……我能翻译的就前几段,和一楼差不多,
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翻译:研究表明,有一种正相关betweenaccounting收入和首席执行官(总裁)的现金补偿;然而,证据还表明,这种积极的协会不再存在时的盈利表现不佳或下降。这后一种结果,导致一些企业的批评补偿政策,认为CEO们不受惩罚为贫困或下降的公司业绩。本研究的目的是为了进一步阐明,扩大收费性能辩论传统的行政奖励的补偿模式,包括一会计基础设置,之前的研究表明有关当前和未来的公司业绩。我们的研究结果表明,有极显着关系会计基础和水平及行政总裁的变化奖金补偿。此外,我们发现一个非常重要的关系双方之间的会计基础和奖金遗漏。当盈余为负或萎缩,我们发现,上述关系保持不变。在相反,当收益为负或下降,我们发现之间的总收入和奖金补偿的关系弱或在我们的分析最微不足道的。两者在一起,我们的结果表明,显然弱关系会计盈余与总裁之间的奖金补偿(特别是当收益为负或下降)的部分。由于这一事实,即不包括奖金补偿模式这是密切相关的会计与基本面奖金补偿。因此,我们得出这样的结论(一)奖金补偿更紧密地联系在一起而不是批评,有时到企业绩效索赔及(ii)奖金颁发给老总当赔偿盈利表现不佳是由至少部分解释存在有利的会计基础。
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