Question

求解: (急!)

4.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the monopoly retailer of wine in that state. Suppose that Quaker Cabernet has no close substitutes and that the statewide inverse demand function for this wine is p=5-0.001Q. The state purchases the wine on the wholesale market for $2 per bottle, and the state-operated liquor stores incur no other expenses to sell this wine.
a.
Find the state’s profit- maximizing price and quantity.
b.
Neighboring New Jersey permits private retailers to sell wine. They face the same statewide demand curve as in Pennsylvania. No interstate wine trade is permitted. Suppose the New Jersey market for Quaker Cabernet is perfectly competitive. Find the corresponding equilibrium price and quantity.
c.
New Jersey taxes wine sales. While the retailers pay the taxes on wine sales, they may pass on some or all of these taxes to consumers by raising prices. Identify the specific tax (tax per bottle sold) for which New Jersey’s equilibrium market price and quantity equal the Pennsylvania monopoly price and quantity. Given the quantity tax, show that New Jersey’s tax revenue equals Pennsylvania’s profit.

Answer 1

宾夕法尼亚联邦垄断葡萄酒零售商的这种状态。假设桂格赤霞珠没有好替代品,全州范围内的这种酒反需求函数为 p = 5-0.001Q。国家议购酒在批发市场为2美元的每一瓶,国营卖酒的商店出售这种酒不承担其他费用。
a.找到这个州的利润最大化价格和数量-。
b.邻近的新泽西允许私人零售商卖酒。他们面对同样的全州范围内的需求曲线在宾西法尼亚州。没有州际的葡萄酒贸易是被允许的。假设新泽西市场赤霞珠是教友派信徒的完全竞争。找到相应的均衡价格和数量。
c.新泽西税的葡萄酒销售。当零售商对葡萄酒的销售交纳税款时,他们将会给在一些或所有这些税的消费者提高价格。鉴别出特定的税收(税务/瓶出售),在新泽西的均衡市场价格和数量相等的宾西法尼亚州垄断价格和数量。给予数量的统计数字表明,新泽西州的税的税收收入等于宾夕法尼亚州的利润。