Question

美国参加越南战争的原因

急要 最好是英文的 先谢谢大家了

Answer 1

美国完全不希望看到殖民帝国政权被由苏联操控的政治机构所取代，所以美国参加越南战争来遏制北越共产党政权的发展。

越南战争，主要是20世纪50年代到70年代，在越南地区爆发的一场。二战后，世界上战争规模最大的一场局部战争。同时，这场战争也是二战后美军参战人数最多、影响力最大的一场局部战争。

越南战争，参战国家主要有南越、北越、中国、美国等国，参战人数大约300万人左右，伤亡人数大概有160万人左右。

扩展资料：

越南战争最高峰的时候，美军投入了超过54万名美国军人在越南作战，大约10万到20万名美国士兵在这个国家之外的地方参与其中。

而参与这场战争的还有美国的一些盟友——韩国、澳大利亚、新西兰、泰国、菲律宾和其它一些国家的部队。

其实北越武装在美国及其盟友面前完全不值一提。不论是武器装备，还是军事人员的素质，美军都完胜北越武装。

而且，美军还拥有制空权和制海权，可以随时为陆军战斗提供强大的火力支援。可是令人意想不到的是美军居然深陷战争的泥潭，虽然赢得了几乎每一场战斗的胜利，却最终输掉了战争。

参考资料：百度百科-越南战争

Answer 2

越南战争 (1961----1975) 这个长达14年,美军死亡5万6千人,受伤30万人,耗资4000亿美元,给美国带来无限创伤的战争,距今已经整整三十年.三十年前的历史经过无数个电影机构与作者的不断演绎,展现给无数的观众与读者太多的遐想空间.这场战争的纯粹内幕至今未能充分解密,或许,有关战争与政治的真实内情,永远也不可能道尽清楚......

1945年9月2日,胡志明领导的“越盟”在河内宣告越南民主共和国成立. 法国扶持的保大皇帝在南方的西贡立国,为争夺越南控制权，越共和法国进行了长达9年的战争. 1954年10月10日,首都河内宣告解放. 根据日内瓦会议（1954）的决议，南北越以北纬17度线分治，北越由胡志明统治，南越在保大皇帝的控制之下.1955年，吴庭艳在西贡发动政变，建立越南共和国, 在美国支持下成立西贡新政府.1961年5月，为防止吴庭艳政权垮台，肯尼迪派遣了一支代号"绿色贝雷帽"的特种部队进驻南越，开启了美军战斗部队进入越南的先河.这一事件也常被认为是越战开始的标志.1962年2月8日，美国在西贡设立了由保罗·哈金斯将军指挥的军事司令部，标志着美国开始直接介入越南战争.

从1962年到1964年，越南南方游击队针对美国 "战略村扫荡计划" 的反扫荡斗争进行了40余次，美军伤亡达2000余人.越南南方游击队解放了南方2/3以上的土地和700万人口，美国军事介入严重受挫. 美国政府趁机出台“逐步升级战略”.

1963年11月1日，美国在南越策动军事政变，杀了吴庭艳，换上了新的傀儡杨文明，并积极寻找扩大战争的借口.1964年8月4日，美国政府宣称，美国驱逐舰“马多克斯”号和“滕纳·乔埃”号在东京湾（即北部湾）公海上进行巡逻遭到北越鱼雷艇的袭击, 随即以轰炸北越海军基地作为报复, 这就是著名的“东京湾事件”(“北部湾事件”）.与此同时，美国还不断增兵,1965年3月8日，3500名美国海军陆战队员在岘港登陆, 到1967年，在越南的美军超过50万人. 美军和南越军队对革命的绞杀激起了更多的反抗, 在南越许多作战区，每家每户都组成战斗单位, 投入到前线与美军作战.

1965年4月3日和4日，美军在清化战役中遭受重创. 这次战役后，美国的轰炸行动陷入窘境. 1965年6月，南越军人阮文绍发动政变上台，成立战时内阁，任国家领导委员会主席.
1967年9月，阮文绍当选越南共和国总统.

从1964到1965年，越南南方民族解放军和游击队机动作战，南方军民共歼灭美军近6000人，超过1961年到1964年12月底所歼灭的美军总数的一倍.1967年7月底，南越政府将武装力量增加6.5万人，总数超过100万，美国总统约翰逊也公开宣布，把美军在越南的布防人数增加到4.5万到5万人，到1968年，美军各兵种将达到52.5万人.

1968年，越南南方人民武装发起“新春攻势”.经过45天激战，歼灭美军15万余人，沉重打击了美国的“逐步升级”战略. 由于南方人民武装的坚决抵抗和越南军民团结一致，美国在越南耗费了巨大人力物力却没有取得预想效果，遭致国内外一致反对,美国国内的反战运动一浪高过一浪.1969年1月，尼克松迫于国内外的强大压力，找到总统国家安全事务助理基辛格，希望他能帮助美国走出越战泥潭.于是基辛格开始积极奔走斡旋, 与越南政府及苏联进行了接洽,苏联态度冷淡,此后美国多方进行谈判，进展依然缓慢.

1969年5月31日，美军司令部宣布：自从1961年美国参加越南战争以来，美军官兵死亡已达3.5万人，损失飞机5400架.尼克松政府上任4个多月，侵越美军又有4000多人丧命，平均每月大约被打死1000多人. 于是,1969年6月8日，尼克松总统在中途岛宣布：在当年8月底以前，从越南撤出美军2.5万人.这是尼克松政府从越南的第一次撤军,但美国仍希望奇迹能够出现,1969年11月3日，尼克松在白宫向全国发表了一篇电视演说，主张“边战、边谈、边化（越南化）、边撤”，遭到群众反对.

1972年3月，武元甲动员北越军事力量，发动了比1968年春节攻势更大规模的"复活节攻势", 尼克松下令美国B-52战略轰炸机对北越进行全面轰炸, 北越的复活节攻势以失败告终，损失超过10万人，武元甲也因此被撤职，由文进勇接任. 复活节攻势的失败，美国B-52战略轰炸的威力，以及急于同美国改善关系的苏联和中华人民共和国的压力迫使北越回到谈判桌前. 1973年1月27日，美国经过长期谈判，与越南民主共和国在关于越南问题的《巴黎协定》上签字，宣告美国在越南军事行动的失败. 美军撤出后，在南越留下了2万多名军事顾问，并保留相当规模的海空部队，支援110万南越军队作战.1974, 游击战依旧在进行，北越重新控制了南方的大部分乡村. 1975年1月，北越从复活节攻势的巨大损失中恢复过来，1975年春，越南北方军队和南方人民武装发动了著名的春季攻势，经过西原、顺化—岘港、西贡三大战役，击溃了南越军队. 1975年4月29日至4月30日，美军组织了有史以来最大的直升机撤退行动，成了美国卷入越战的结束的标志. 同日西贡陷落，北越攻陷了美国驻西贡大使馆和南越总统府，南越政权覆灭.越南战争以越共的全面胜利告终.

越战期间，美国向越南投下了800万吨炸药，远超过第二次世界大战各战场投弹量的总和，造成越南160多万人死亡和整个印度支那1000多万难民流离失所；美国自己也损失惨重，5.6万余人丧生，30多万人受伤，耗资4000多亿美元,时间拖延最长,前后14年，是美国历史上最长的国外战争，造成了无法估量的心灵创伤。

在战争中失去双腿的伦道夫·巴克愤怒地控诉道：“政府要我们为了自由和理想去越南战斗，而战争却使我永远失去了自由,而且至今我也不知道自己为了一种什么样的理想和自由去战斗,每年我除了与那些悲惨的战友们泪流满面地团聚外，似乎痛苦与孤独就是我生活的全部.”

美国前国务卿亨利·基辛格说：“越南战争也许是一场悲剧，美国本来是根本不应该闯进去的.”资深参议员乔治·麦戈文说：“我认为，印度支那战争是我国历史上最大的军事、政治、经济和道义的错误.”

越战之后，卸任了近30年的美国前国防部长麦克纳马拉，于1995年发表了《回顾:越南的悲剧与教训》一书.麦克纳马拉认为:美国政府决策人没有意识到，无论是我们的人民，还是我们的领袖，都不是万能的.在不涉及我们自身存亡的事务中，要判断什么是另一个国家和人民的最大利益，应由国际社会进行公开辩论来决定.我们并不拥有天赋的权力，来用我们自己的理想或选择去塑造任何其他国家.可是直到今天，在世界上许多地方，我们仍然在重复着类似的错误......

1976年1月2日南北越统一，组成了新的越南社会主义共和国，西贡被改名胡志明市.数百名南越的支持者被处决，更多人被捕, 越共取得政权并统治至今.

伤亡统计:
北越正规军和被认为是越共游击队的人员：110万人死亡，60万人受伤，33万人失踪.
美军：越南战争期间，美军死亡5.8万人，受伤30.4万人，2000多人失踪.
南越政府军：死亡13万人，受伤50万人.
韩国军队：死亡4500人.
澳大利亚军队：死亡500人，2400人受伤.
泰国军队：死亡350人.
新西兰军队：死亡83人.

Answer 3

American wars have obvious starting points or precipitating causes: the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775, the capture of Fort Sumter in 1861, the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, for example. But there was no fixed beginning for the U.S. war in Vietnam. The United States entered that war incrementally, in a series of steps between 1950 and 1965. In May 1950, President Harry S. Truman authorized a modest program of economic and military aid to the French, who were fighting to retain control of their Indochina colony, including Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam. When the Vietnamese Nationalist (and Communist-led) Vietminh army defeated French forces at Dienbienphu in 1954, the French were compelled to accede to the creation of a Communist Vietnam north of the 17th parallel while leaving a non-Communist entity south of that line. The United States refused to accept the arrangement. The administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower undertook instead to build a nation from the spurious political entity that was South Vietnam by fabricating a government there, taking over control from the French, dispatching military advisers to train a South Vietnamese army, and unleashing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct psychological warfare against the North.
President John F. Kennedy rounded another turning point in early 1961, when he secretly sent 400 Special Operations Forces-trained (Green Beret) soldiers to teach the South Vietnamese how to fight what was called counterinsurgency war against Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, there were more than 16,000 U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam, and more than 100 Americans had been killed. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, committed the United States most fully to the war. In August 1964, he secured from Congress a functional (not actual) declaration of war: the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Then, in February and March 1965, Johnson authorized the sustained bombing, by U.S. aircraft, of targets north of the 17th parallel, and on 8 March dispatched 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam. Legal declaration or no, the United States was now at war.
The multiple starting dates for the war complicate efforts to describe the causes of U.S. entry. The United States became involved in the war for a number of reasons, and these evolved and shifted over time. Primarily, every American president regarded the enemy in Vietnam--the Vietminh; its 1960s successor, the National Liberation Front (NLF); and the government of North Vietnam, led by *Ho Chi Minh--as agents of global communism. U.S. policymakers, and most Americans, regarded communism as the antithesis of all they held dear. Communists scorned democracy, violated human rights, pursued military aggression, and created closed state economies that barely traded with capitalist countries. Americans compared communism to a contagious disease. If it took hold in one nation, U.S. policymakers expected contiguous nations to fall to communism, too, as if nations were dominoes lined up on end. In 1949, when the Communist Party came to power in China, Washington feared that Vietnam would become the next Asian domino. That was one reason for Truman's 1950 decision to give aid to the French who were fighting the Vietminh,
Truman also hoped that assisting the French in Vietnam would help to shore up the developed, non-Communist nations, whose fates were in surprising ways tied to the preservation of Vietnam and, given the domino theory, all of Southeast Asia. Free world dominion over the region would provide markets for Japan, rebuilding with American help after the Pacific War. U.S. involvement in Vietnam reassured the British, who linked their postwar recovery to the revival of the rubber and tin industries in their colony of Malaya, one of Vietnam's neighbors. And with U.S. aid, the French could concentrate on economic recovery at home, and could hope ultimately to recall their Indochina officer corps to oversee the rearmament of West Germany, a Cold War measure deemed essential by the Americans. These ambitions formed a second set of reasons why the United States became involved in Vietnam.
As presidents committed the United States to conflict bit by bit, many of these ambitions were forgotten. Instead, inertia developed against withdrawing from Vietnam. Washington believed that U.S. withdrawal would result in a Communist victory--Eisenhower acknowledged that, had elections been held as scheduled in Vietnam in 1956, "Ho Chi Minh would have won 80% of the vote"--and no U.S. president wanted to lose a country to communism. Democrats in particular, like Kennedy and Johnson, feared a right-wing backlash should they give up the fight; they remembered vividly the accusatory tone of the Republicans' 1950 question, "Who lost China?" The commitment to Vietnam itself, passed from administration to administration, took on validity aside from any rational basis it might once have had. Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all gave their word that the United States would stand by its South Vietnamese allies. If the United States abandoned the South Vietnamese, its word would be regarded as unreliable by other governments, friendly or not. So U.S. credibility seemed at stake.
Along with the larger structural and ideological causes of the war in Vietnam, the experience, personality, and temperament of each president played a role in deepening the U.S. commitment. Dwight Eisenhower restrained U.S. involvement because, having commanded troops in battle, he doubted the United States could fight a land war in Southeast Asia. The youthful John Kennedy, on the other hand, felt he had to prove his resolve to the American people and his Communist adversaries, especially in the aftermath of several foreign policy blunders early in his administration. Lyndon Johnson saw the Vietnam War as a test of his mettle, as a Southerner and as a man. He exhorted his soldiers to "nail the coonskin to the wall" in Vietnam, likening victory to a successful hunting expedition.
When Johnson began bombing North Vietnam and sent the Marines to South Vietnam in early 1965, he had every intention of fighting a limited war. He and his advisers worried that too lavish a use of U.S. firepower might prompt the Chinese to enter the conflict. It was not expected that the North Vietnamese and the NLF would hold out long against the American military. And yet U.S. policymakers never managed to fit military strategy to U.S. goals in Vietnam. Massive bombing had little effect against a decentralized economy like North Vietnam's. Kennedy had favored counterinsurgency warfare in the South Vietnamese countryside, and Johnson endorsed this strategy, but the political side of counterinsurgeny--the effort to win the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese peasantry-- was at best underdeveloped and probably doomed. Presidents proved reluctant to mobilize American society to the extent the generals thought necessary to defeat the enemy.
As the United States went to war in 1965, a few voices were raised in dissent. Within the Johnson administration, Undersecretary of State George Ball warned that the South Vietnamese government was a functional nonentity and simply could not be sustained by the United States, even with a major effort. Antiwar protest groups formed on many of the nation's campuses; in June, the leftist organization Students for a Democratic Society decided to make the war its principal target. But major dissent would not begin until 1966 or later. By and large in 1965, Americans supported the administration's claim that it was fighting to stop communism in Southeast Asia, or people simply shrugged and went about their daily lives, unaware that this gradually escalating war would tear American society apart.

Answer 4

困局中的美国若有心，一批原子弹下去，摧毁整个北越南的战略纵深搓搓有余，不会落到1968年10月，放弃南越南政权，开始全面撤军的无奈，要知道整个越南战争，美国士兵光死亡就有近6万人。