Question

4..Regulatory responses and management accounting: an institutional theory of agency interpretation

4..Regulatory responses and management accounting: an institutional theory of agency interpretation
4.1.Whilst EAT does help to define some issues in corporate governance (especially the possible role of contract and financial incentives), its reductionist approach can prematurely closedown and confine. in contrast, a strength of the Institutional theory of agency is its openness about human behaviour and organizational practices. A further strength of the Institutional theory of agency is that it offers a way of linking the institutionally informed management accounting research that has been increasingly adopted at the organizational level to the wider political, legal and social processes associated with corporate governance and professionalization. From an ITA perspective, the application of management accounting practices, from the local business unit to the highest board level, will be influenced by a variety of competing narratives that inform the organizational field of corporate governance. It is argued that the competing narratives reflect an underlying tension between the institutionalized routines of management accounting (Scapens, 1994) and a desire by senior managers, as agents, to resist the institutionalization of their role.
4.Corporate governance regulation, professionalization and the stewardship role of management accounting
5.The multiple roles ascribed to management accounting in textbooks (see, e.g., Drury, 2004; Seal et al., 2005) may be related to different narratives. Whilst the routine, taken-for-granted aspects of the controlling role resonates very well with institutionalist insights and the more normative treatment of decision-making has conventionally been derived from neoclassical economics (Scapens, 1994), the stewardship role of management accounting has been neglected. In this section, the stewardship role is analysed through the theoretical lens of the Institutional theory of agency via an examination of the interaction between external regulation and management accounting practices. Focusing particularly on the proposals from CIMA that call for the mobilization of strategic management accounting in an Enterprise Governance Framework [International Federation of Accounts (IFAC, 2004)], the Institutional theory of agency is used not only to trace the likely impact of regulation but also to identify possible resistance to new applications of strategic management accounting
哪位好心人帮我翻译一下由于术语太多本人能力有限翻译不了，请求帮助

Answer 1

4.。管制的反应和管理会计: 一个代理商解释的制度理论
4.1.一会儿吃做帮助在企业的统治 (尤其契约的可能角色和财务的激励) 中定义一些议题, 它的 reductionist 早熟地接近罐子关闭而且限制。 在差别，代理商的制度理论的力量是它的关于人类的行为开着和组织的练习。代理商的制度理论的较进一步的力量是它提供对与企业的统治和 professionalization 有关的比较宽的政治上、合法而且社会的程序联编已经逐渐地在组织的水平被采用的制度见多识广的管理会计研究的方法。从一种 ITA 远景，管理会计的申请练习,从当地的商务单位到最高的董事会水平, 将会被告知组织领域企业的统治的多种竞争叙述影响。它被主张竞争叙述反映在下面资深经理的管理会计 (Scapens,1994) 的被常式组织化的和欲望之间的紧张,如代理人, 抵抗他们的角色的机构化。4.企业的统治规则、 professionalization 和管理会计的总管的职务角色
5.多个角色对在教科书中的管理会计归于 (举例来说见到特鲁里街,2004; 印章及其研究同仁,2005) 可能被讲到不同的叙述。 被拿的一会儿常式 - 为-允许控制角色的方面以 institutionalist 洞察力和决策的比较标准治疗共呜得很好已经照惯例起源于新古典主义的经济学 (Scapens,1994), 管理会计的总管的职务角色已经被疏忽。在这一个区段中，总管的职务角色经由考试被外部的规则和管理会计练习之间的交互作用分析过代理商的制度理论的理论上透镜。在来自要求一个企业统治结构的策略管理的动员会计 [帐户 (IFAC,2004) 的国际联邦] 的 CIMA 的提议上特别地集中, 代理商的制度理论被用不但追踪规则的有可能冲击而且识别策略管理会计的对新申请可能的抗拒

(多谢“爱词霸”）