Question

求高手帮忙翻译一段文章~~~非常感谢~！~~3

In the original version of the network model governments are assumed
to sign new international agreements or break existing ones in order to
increase domestic welfare. The present article replaces this assumption with
the purpose of introducing the stylized fact (iii) described above. In particular,
the framework uses the same general approach of de Gorter and Tsur (1991)
and Swinnen (1994) and assumes that governments sign new international
agreements or break existing ones with the objective of increasing the probability
of being re-elected. It is important to clarify that even when the political
support function proposed in this paper generates the same stable networks
than the weighted welfare function used by Goyal and Joshi (2006), the former
has a key property that makes this function different from that used by these
authors. That is the concavity of the political support function with respect
to both consumer surplus and profits. When this concavity is present (i.e.
when governments care about political support), lump sum transfers from
consumers to firms can affect the marginal gain of political support after an
agreement is signed. However this is not possible when governments consider a
welfare function because this is a linear function with respect to these variables.
A formal proof is given in Proposition 3 of May and Worrall (2010). The
present paper uses this property to explore how bilateral agreements could
be promoted by means of these transfers.

Answer 1

原始的网络模式是想要达成新的意见或打破现存的以增加本国福利。现存的条款用它所带来的事实代替了这一假设。特别要说的是，这一结构运用同de Gorter，Tsur(1991)和Swinnen (1994)同样的方法并且假定政府签署新的协定或者打破那些原有的以增加重新选举可能性为目标的协定。这里需要澄清的是，即便文件里提出的政策支持与Goyal和Joshi（2006）运用的加权福利有着同样稳定的网络，但是前者有一个很重要的属性，就是使得这一功能区别于其他。这就是政策支持功能关于消费者盈余和利益的凹陷。当这一凹陷显现出来（比如，当政府开始关注政策支持的时候），并且当一个协定被签署过后，从消费者转移至公司的总金额可以影响政策功能的边际收益。但是，当政府在考虑一个福利功能的时候这就变得不可能了，因为这是一个关于变量的线性函数。这一观点在Proposition 3 of May and Worrall (2010)被证实过。这一现存的文件被用于研究怎样通过转换的方式来提升双边协议。

Answer 2

在原来的版本的网络模型假设政府签署新的国际协定或打破现有为了提高我们国内的福利。本文以代替这个假设目的介绍程序化了的事实(3)前述。特别是,该框架充分利用相同的一般方法Tsur德Gorter(1991)和Swinnen(1994年)和假设政府签订新的国际协议或打破现有的增加与客观的概率被成功连任。它是重要的澄清,即使政治本文提出了支持功能产生相同的稳定的网络比加权福利函数,用戈亚尔希(2006),前者有一个主要特性使得这个函数不同,所使用的这些作者。那是凹函数的政治支持和尊敬双方消费者剩余和利润。当这出现凹(如下。当政府关心政治支持),一次性转移消费者会影响公司的边际收益后的政治支持协议的签署。然而这是不可能在政府考虑因为这是一个福利函数的线性函数对这些变量。给出了一个正式的证明的命题Worrall 3(2010)。这利用这个特性,本文探讨双边协议所无法比拟的通过这些提升的过渡。