Question

求英语达人给我翻译一下下面这段话。

We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firm’s own dividend (or share price), a given increase in the firm’s output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager’s income. Incentive contracts of sufficient yet modest convexity are shown to result in an indeterminate general equilibrium, one in which business cycles are driven by self-fulfilling fluctuations in the manager’s expectations that are unrelated to the economy’s fundamentals. Arbitrarily large fluctuations in macroeconomic variables may result. We also provide a theoretical justification for the proposed family of contracts by demonstrating that they yield first-best outcomes for specific parameter choices.

Answer 1

我们考虑一个简单的变异的标准的实际商业周期模型中，股东雇佣自利的行政管理公司的名义。一般家庭的补偿合同，类似于那些在实践研究。当补偿凸坚定自己的股利（或价格），考虑增加公司的输出产生的额外一单位投入的结果超过比例增加经理的收入。激励合约没有足够的谦虚凸的结果显示在一个不确定的一般均衡，在商业周期是由自我实现的波动在经理的期望，无关的经济基础。任意大的波动会导致宏观经济变量。我们还提供了一个理论上的理由，该家族的合同表明，他们最好的结果为特定参数的选择。