英文翻译
(2)percentageoftotalcompensationthatisequity-based,and(3)percentageoftotalcompensatio...
(2) percentage of total compensation that
is equity-based, and (3) percentage of total compensation in salary plus bonus.
Total compensation is the sum of the dollar values of salary, bonus, dividend
units, saving plans, properties, insurance, and the value of the awards from
grants of new stock options, phantom stocks, restricted stocks, performance
shares, and performance units. The percentage of total compensation that is
equity-based is measured as the ratio of the sum of the value of awards from
grants of new stock options, restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance
shares to total compensation. Finally, the cash percentage of total compensation
is the ratio of salary plus bonus to total compensation.
In analyzing the effect of compensation structure on firm performance, I only
considered expected rather than realized compensation. Thus, the measurement
of stock options exclude the change in the value of the accrued stock of
outstanding options during the sample period. The reason is that there is
a mechanical relation between firm performance and realized executives’ wealth.
As an example, consider two firms that pay salaries of $X and that made
a one-time-only stock option grant of 1,000 shares several years ago (with no
subsequent grants). Suppose one of these firms turns out to be a high performer,
while the other one is low performer. The low-performing firm will have a zero
realized option value, while the high performer (with high appreciation) will
have a large realized option value. Thus, a regression of firm performance on
realized stock options will yield a positive mechanical correlation, and will not
allow inferences about the effectiveness of stock options. Measurement of
compensation is discussed further in the appendix.
Ownership structure: The percentage of equity held by managers is measured
using the sum of their direct share ownership and their stock options outstanding
plus share ownership by their immediate families. The percentage of equity
held by all outside blockholders is measured using the sum of the percentages of
equity held by individual investors, institutional investors, and corporations
who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company. I choose 5% (as
many researchers do) because this ownnership level triggers mandatory public
filing under SEC regulation. 展开
is equity-based, and (3) percentage of total compensation in salary plus bonus.
Total compensation is the sum of the dollar values of salary, bonus, dividend
units, saving plans, properties, insurance, and the value of the awards from
grants of new stock options, phantom stocks, restricted stocks, performance
shares, and performance units. The percentage of total compensation that is
equity-based is measured as the ratio of the sum of the value of awards from
grants of new stock options, restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance
shares to total compensation. Finally, the cash percentage of total compensation
is the ratio of salary plus bonus to total compensation.
In analyzing the effect of compensation structure on firm performance, I only
considered expected rather than realized compensation. Thus, the measurement
of stock options exclude the change in the value of the accrued stock of
outstanding options during the sample period. The reason is that there is
a mechanical relation between firm performance and realized executives’ wealth.
As an example, consider two firms that pay salaries of $X and that made
a one-time-only stock option grant of 1,000 shares several years ago (with no
subsequent grants). Suppose one of these firms turns out to be a high performer,
while the other one is low performer. The low-performing firm will have a zero
realized option value, while the high performer (with high appreciation) will
have a large realized option value. Thus, a regression of firm performance on
realized stock options will yield a positive mechanical correlation, and will not
allow inferences about the effectiveness of stock options. Measurement of
compensation is discussed further in the appendix.
Ownership structure: The percentage of equity held by managers is measured
using the sum of their direct share ownership and their stock options outstanding
plus share ownership by their immediate families. The percentage of equity
held by all outside blockholders is measured using the sum of the percentages of
equity held by individual investors, institutional investors, and corporations
who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company. I choose 5% (as
many researchers do) because this ownnership level triggers mandatory public
filing under SEC regulation. 展开
4个回答
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(2) percentage of total compensation that is equity-based, and
（2）以股本为基础的赔偿总额的百分比
(3) percentage of total compensation in salary plus bonus.
对于 工资和奖金总和的 赔偿的百分比
Total compensation is the sum of the dollar values of salary, bonus, dividend units, saving plans, properties, insurance, and the value of the awards from grants of new stock options, phantom stocks, restricted stocks, performance shares, and performance units.
赔偿总额是以下所有的总合：用美元去衡量的工资，奖金，红利，节水规划，资产，保险，及通过控股权的转让而赚的钱（the value of the awards from grants of new stock options我翻不好） ，影子股票（也有称妖股的），有限制的股票，业绩股份，业绩单位。
The percentage of total compensation that is equity-based is measured as the ratio of the sum of the value of awards from grants of new stock options, restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance shares to total compensation.
以股本为基础的赔偿总额的百分比是通过计算 通过控股权的转让而赚的钱，有限制的股票，影子股票以及业绩股份 和 总赔偿金 的比例来测算的。
Finally, the cash percentage of total compensation is the ratio of salary plus bonus to total compensation.
最后，整个赔偿的现金比例指的是 工资和奖金之和 比上 总赔偿金。
In analyzing the effect of compensation structure on firm performance, I only considered expected rather than realized compensation.
在分析关于企业业绩的补偿结构带来的影响的时候，，我只考虑到预期的赔偿，而不是真正现实化的赔偿。
Thus, the measurement of stock options exclude the change in the value of the accrued stock of outstanding options during the sample period.
这样一来，对于股票期权的估测就排除 已经被买了的累积股票价值的改变 在外。
The reason is that there is a mechanical relation between firm performance and realized executives’ wealth.
这是因为公司业绩 和 （真正）所积累的经理人的财富有一种机械的关系。
As an example, consider two firms that pay salaries of $X and that made a one-time-only stock option grant of 1,000 shares several years ago (with no subsequent grants).
举个例子，靠路边以下两个公司都给员工x美元工资，并且都在几年前作了 一次完成的 1000股股票期权的出售（其后没有再出售）。
Suppose one of these firms turns out to be a high performer, while the other one is low performer.
假设其中一个公司的地位提高了很多，而另一个公司地位还是很低。
The low-performing firm will have a zero realized option value, while the high performer (with high appreciation) will have a large realized option value.
业绩不好的（地位低的）公司将实现零期权价值增长，而业绩好的公司（拥有高增值）将会实现大量的期权价值的提高。
Thus, a regression of firm performance on realized stock options will yield a positive mechanical correlation, and will not allow inferences about the effectiveness of stock options.
这样，关于实现期权股票增长问题的 公司业绩的回归 将产生出一个积极的机械的关系，同时，回归将不允许对于股票期权有效性的推断。
Measurement of compensation is discussed further in the appendix.
对赔偿金的估测将在附件中进行进一步的讨论。
Ownership structure: The percentage of equity held by managers is measured using the sum of their direct share ownership and their stock options outstanding plus share ownership by their immediate families.
所有制结构：经理所占有的普通股的测量是通过 将 他们直接股的拥有量，他们突出的期权股票，他们直系亲属所拥有的股份 加起来 来进行的。
The percentage of equity held by all outside blockholders is measured using the sum of the percentages of equity held by individual investors, institutional investors, and corporations who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company.
外董事拥有的普通股份百分比的测量方法把 个体投资者、团体投资者、拥有至少5%该公司通股的其他公司所拥有的普通股的百分比 加起来。
I choose 5% (as many researchers do) because this ownnership level triggers mandatory public filing under SEC regulation.
我选择了5%这个数（正如被许多别的研究员也这么做），因为根据SEC规例，这种所有制的水平能够触发强制性公共备案
（2）以股本为基础的赔偿总额的百分比
(3) percentage of total compensation in salary plus bonus.
对于 工资和奖金总和的 赔偿的百分比
Total compensation is the sum of the dollar values of salary, bonus, dividend units, saving plans, properties, insurance, and the value of the awards from grants of new stock options, phantom stocks, restricted stocks, performance shares, and performance units.
赔偿总额是以下所有的总合：用美元去衡量的工资，奖金，红利，节水规划，资产，保险，及通过控股权的转让而赚的钱（the value of the awards from grants of new stock options我翻不好） ，影子股票（也有称妖股的），有限制的股票，业绩股份，业绩单位。
The percentage of total compensation that is equity-based is measured as the ratio of the sum of the value of awards from grants of new stock options, restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance shares to total compensation.
以股本为基础的赔偿总额的百分比是通过计算 通过控股权的转让而赚的钱，有限制的股票，影子股票以及业绩股份 和 总赔偿金 的比例来测算的。
Finally, the cash percentage of total compensation is the ratio of salary plus bonus to total compensation.
最后，整个赔偿的现金比例指的是 工资和奖金之和 比上 总赔偿金。
In analyzing the effect of compensation structure on firm performance, I only considered expected rather than realized compensation.
在分析关于企业业绩的补偿结构带来的影响的时候，，我只考虑到预期的赔偿，而不是真正现实化的赔偿。
Thus, the measurement of stock options exclude the change in the value of the accrued stock of outstanding options during the sample period.
这样一来，对于股票期权的估测就排除 已经被买了的累积股票价值的改变 在外。
The reason is that there is a mechanical relation between firm performance and realized executives’ wealth.
这是因为公司业绩 和 （真正）所积累的经理人的财富有一种机械的关系。
As an example, consider two firms that pay salaries of $X and that made a one-time-only stock option grant of 1,000 shares several years ago (with no subsequent grants).
举个例子，靠路边以下两个公司都给员工x美元工资，并且都在几年前作了 一次完成的 1000股股票期权的出售（其后没有再出售）。
Suppose one of these firms turns out to be a high performer, while the other one is low performer.
假设其中一个公司的地位提高了很多，而另一个公司地位还是很低。
The low-performing firm will have a zero realized option value, while the high performer (with high appreciation) will have a large realized option value.
业绩不好的（地位低的）公司将实现零期权价值增长，而业绩好的公司（拥有高增值）将会实现大量的期权价值的提高。
Thus, a regression of firm performance on realized stock options will yield a positive mechanical correlation, and will not allow inferences about the effectiveness of stock options.
这样，关于实现期权股票增长问题的 公司业绩的回归 将产生出一个积极的机械的关系，同时，回归将不允许对于股票期权有效性的推断。
Measurement of compensation is discussed further in the appendix.
对赔偿金的估测将在附件中进行进一步的讨论。
Ownership structure: The percentage of equity held by managers is measured using the sum of their direct share ownership and their stock options outstanding plus share ownership by their immediate families.
所有制结构：经理所占有的普通股的测量是通过 将 他们直接股的拥有量，他们突出的期权股票，他们直系亲属所拥有的股份 加起来 来进行的。
The percentage of equity held by all outside blockholders is measured using the sum of the percentages of equity held by individual investors, institutional investors, and corporations who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company.
外董事拥有的普通股份百分比的测量方法把 个体投资者、团体投资者、拥有至少5%该公司通股的其他公司所拥有的普通股的百分比 加起来。
I choose 5% (as many researchers do) because this ownnership level triggers mandatory public filing under SEC regulation.
我选择了5%这个数（正如被许多别的研究员也这么做），因为根据SEC规例，这种所有制的水平能够触发强制性公共备案
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the value of the awards from
2)等量的总补偿量的百分比
3）总补贴量在附加奖金中的比例
总补贴是工资、奖金、分割单元、储蓄计划、财产、保险的货币价值的总和，
2)等量的总补偿量的百分比
3）总补贴量在附加奖金中的比例
总补贴是工资、奖金、分割单元、储蓄计划、财产、保险的货币价值的总和，
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( 2 ）占总额的百分比赔偿
是制度的公平性为基础的，以及（ 3 ）占总额的百分比补偿工资加上奖金。
总赔偿金额的美元价值的工资，奖金，红利
单位节约计划，物业，保险，及价值颁奖
补助金的新的股票期权，妖股，有限制的股票，业绩
股票和业绩单位。总额的比例补偿，即
股本为基础，是衡量比例的总和价值奖项由
补助金的新的股票期权，受限股票，股票的幽灵，和业绩
股票报酬总额。最后，现金比例的报酬总额
的比例应是工资加上奖金等共计赔偿。
在分析这一效应的补偿结构，对企业绩效而言，我只
考虑到预期的，而不是实现补偿。因此，测量
股票期权排除价值的改变累积存量
尚未行使之购股权，在取样期。原因是，有
一个机械的关系，公司业绩实现了高管的财富。
作为一个例子，考虑两个企业支付工资为X和，使得
一时间只股票期权授予1000股数年前（无
随后赠款） 。假设之一，这些公司原来是一个高度演员，
而另一人则是低演员。低不良的坚强意志，有一个零
实现期权价值，而高演奏员（高升值）会
有大量实现期权价值。于是，一种回归的坚定表现
实现股票期权将产生积极的机械相关的，不会
允许推断的有效性股票期权。测量
补偿是进一步讨论附录。
所有制结构：比例的股本持有的管理者，是衡量
用一笔他们之间的直接股权和股票期权优秀
加上分享所有权及其直系亲属。百分比的股本
举行由所有外来的权限测量方法的总和的百分比
股票持有的个人投资者，机构投资者和公司
谁拥有至少5 ％的公司的普通股。我选择了5 ％ （
不少研究者做） ，因为这是所有者水平触发强制性公开
根据备案证管会规例
是制度的公平性为基础的，以及（ 3 ）占总额的百分比补偿工资加上奖金。
总赔偿金额的美元价值的工资，奖金，红利
单位节约计划，物业，保险，及价值颁奖
补助金的新的股票期权，妖股，有限制的股票，业绩
股票和业绩单位。总额的比例补偿，即
股本为基础，是衡量比例的总和价值奖项由
补助金的新的股票期权，受限股票，股票的幽灵，和业绩
股票报酬总额。最后，现金比例的报酬总额
的比例应是工资加上奖金等共计赔偿。
在分析这一效应的补偿结构，对企业绩效而言，我只
考虑到预期的，而不是实现补偿。因此，测量
股票期权排除价值的改变累积存量
尚未行使之购股权，在取样期。原因是，有
一个机械的关系，公司业绩实现了高管的财富。
作为一个例子，考虑两个企业支付工资为X和，使得
一时间只股票期权授予1000股数年前（无
随后赠款） 。假设之一，这些公司原来是一个高度演员，
而另一人则是低演员。低不良的坚强意志，有一个零
实现期权价值，而高演奏员（高升值）会
有大量实现期权价值。于是，一种回归的坚定表现
实现股票期权将产生积极的机械相关的，不会
允许推断的有效性股票期权。测量
补偿是进一步讨论附录。
所有制结构：比例的股本持有的管理者，是衡量
用一笔他们之间的直接股权和股票期权优秀
加上分享所有权及其直系亲属。百分比的股本
举行由所有外来的权限测量方法的总和的百分比
股票持有的个人投资者，机构投资者和公司
谁拥有至少5 ％的公司的普通股。我选择了5 ％ （
不少研究者做） ，因为这是所有者水平触发强制性公开
根据备案证管会规例
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占总额的百分比赔偿
是制度的公平性为基础的，以及（ 3 ）占总额的百分比补偿工资加上奖金。
总赔偿金额的美元价值的工资，奖金，红利
单位节约计划，物业，保险，及价值颁奖
补助金的新的股票期权，妖股，有限制的股票，业绩
股票和业绩单位。总额的比例补偿，即
股本为基础，是衡量比例的总和价值奖项由
补助金的新的股票期权，受限股票，股票的幽灵，和业绩
股票报酬总额。最后，现金比例的报酬总额
的比例应是工资加上奖金等共计赔偿。
在分析这一效应的补偿结构，对企业绩效而言，我只
考虑到预期的，而不是实现补偿。因此，测量
股票期权排除价值的改变累积存量
尚未行使之购股权，在取样期。原因是，有
一个机械的关系，公司业绩实现了高管的财富。
作为一个例子，考虑两个企业支付工资为X和，使得
一时间只股票期权授予1000股数年前（无
随后赠款） 。假设之一，这些公司原来是一个高度演员，
而另一人则是低演员。低不良的坚强意志，有一个零
实现期权价值，而高演奏员（高升值）会
有大量实现期权价值。于是，一种回归的坚定表现
实现股票期权将产生积极的机械相关的，不会
允许推断的有效性股票期权。测量
补偿是进一步讨论附录。
所有制结构：比例的股本持有的管理者，是衡量
用一笔他们之间的直接股权和股票期权优秀
加上分享所有权及其直系亲属。百分比的股本
举行由所有外来的权限测量方法的总和的百分比
股票持有的个人投资者，机构投资者和公司
谁拥有至少5 ％的公司的普通股。我选择了5 ％ （
不少研究者做） ，因为这是ownnership水平触发强制性公开
根据备案证管会规例。
是制度的公平性为基础的，以及（ 3 ）占总额的百分比补偿工资加上奖金。
总赔偿金额的美元价值的工资，奖金，红利
单位节约计划，物业，保险，及价值颁奖
补助金的新的股票期权，妖股，有限制的股票，业绩
股票和业绩单位。总额的比例补偿，即
股本为基础，是衡量比例的总和价值奖项由
补助金的新的股票期权，受限股票，股票的幽灵，和业绩
股票报酬总额。最后，现金比例的报酬总额
的比例应是工资加上奖金等共计赔偿。
在分析这一效应的补偿结构，对企业绩效而言，我只
考虑到预期的，而不是实现补偿。因此，测量
股票期权排除价值的改变累积存量
尚未行使之购股权，在取样期。原因是，有
一个机械的关系，公司业绩实现了高管的财富。
作为一个例子，考虑两个企业支付工资为X和，使得
一时间只股票期权授予1000股数年前（无
随后赠款） 。假设之一，这些公司原来是一个高度演员，
而另一人则是低演员。低不良的坚强意志，有一个零
实现期权价值，而高演奏员（高升值）会
有大量实现期权价值。于是，一种回归的坚定表现
实现股票期权将产生积极的机械相关的，不会
允许推断的有效性股票期权。测量
补偿是进一步讨论附录。
所有制结构：比例的股本持有的管理者，是衡量
用一笔他们之间的直接股权和股票期权优秀
加上分享所有权及其直系亲属。百分比的股本
举行由所有外来的权限测量方法的总和的百分比
股票持有的个人投资者，机构投资者和公司
谁拥有至少5 ％的公司的普通股。我选择了5 ％ （
不少研究者做） ，因为这是ownnership水平触发强制性公开
根据备案证管会规例。
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