Question

麻烦高手翻译一下，不要翻译软件的，谢谢。我在线等

What systematic factors underlie the significant differences between the dividend rates of European and Asian group-affiliated corporations? Table 1 showed that a higher percentage of European corporations have multiple large owners with at least 10 percent of the shares, which might mitigate expropriation by the controlling shareholder. To test this, we add a Multiple Owners dummy to identify such corporations in regressions of the dividend rates of groupaffiliated corporations in Europe and Asia. To save space, we report only the results for the 20 percent level of control, as the results for the 10 percent level are essentially the same. Table 8 reports a striking difference between the coefficients of this dummy estimated in the two regressions. In Europe, the coefficient is significantly positive for two of the dividend rates, suggesting that multiple large owners indeed help limit the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder. In Asia, the coefficient is significantly negative for two of the dividend rates, suggesting that the other large owners typically collude with the controlling shareholder in expropriating minority shareholders. Accounts of Asian business relationships (Gordon S. Redding (1995)) suggest that the other large owners would typically be longstanding allies of the controlling shareholder, who could compensate them through other business dealings between their groups.

Answer 1

是什么因素，有系统地了解了显着的差异，股息率，欧洲和亚洲集团的下属公司？表1表明，较高比率的欧洲公司有多个大型的业主至少有10 ％的股份，这可能减轻征用的控股股东。为了对此进行测试，除此之外，我们的多个所有者道具，以查明这些公司在回归中的股息率groupaffiliated公司在欧洲和亚洲市场。为了节省空间，我们的报告，只是结果为20 ％的水平，控制，结果为10 ％的水平基本上相同。表8报告的一个鲜明的差异系数这一道具，估计在这两个回归分析。在欧洲，摩擦系数是显着的正为两个股息率，显示为多个大型业主确实有助于限制征用的小股东，由控股股东。在亚洲，该系数是显着负两年的股息率，暗示其他大业主通常勾结与控股股东在侵占小股东。户口亚洲的商业关系（戈登第莱汀（ 1995 ） ）认为其他大型业主一般将长期存在盟国的控股股东，他们可以补偿他们通过其他业务往来，他们群体。