Question

哪位高人能帮我翻译一下这段英文呀？

Probably the most famous reductionist view of privacy is one from Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975). Noting that there is little agreement on what privacy is, Thomson examines a number of cases that have been thought to be violations of the right to privacy. On closer inspection, however, Thomson believes all those cases can be adequately and equally well explained in terms of violations of property rights or rights over the person, such as a right not to be listened to. Ultimately the right to privacy, on Thomson's view, is merely a cluster of rights. Those rights in the cluster are always overlapped by, and can be fully explained by, property rights or rights to bodily security. The right to privacy, on her view, is “derivative” in the sense that there is no need to find what is common in the cluster of privacy rights. Privacy is derivative in its importance and justification, according to Thomson, as any privacy violation is better understood as the violation of a more basic right. Numerous commentators provide strong arguments against Thomson's critique (Scanlon, 1975; Inness, 1992).

Answer 1

大概是最有名的简化鉴于隐私，是一个由朱迪思贾维斯汤姆逊（ 1975年） 。注意到，没有什么协议，什么是隐私，汤姆森探讨了一些案件已被认为是侵犯私隐权。仔细检查，不过，汤姆逊认为，所有这些案件中，可以得到充分的，并且同样很好解释而言，对财产权的侵犯或权利的人，如一个有权不被听见。最终权，隐私权，对汤姆森的看法，仅仅是一组权利。这些权利在集群总是重叠，可以充分解释，财产权利或权利身体安全。私隐权，她认为，这是"衍生" ，在某种意义上说，有没有必要寻找什么是共同的，在集群的隐私权利。隐私权是衍生于它的重要性和理由，据汤姆逊，因为任何隐私的侵犯，是更好地理解为违反了一个更基本的权利。许多评论家提供强有力的论据，对汤姆森的批判（ scanlon ， 1975年; inness ， 1992年） 。

Answer 2

大概是最有名的简化鉴于隐私，是一个由朱迪思贾维斯汤姆逊（ 1975年） 。注意到，没有什么协议，什么是隐私，汤姆森探讨了一些案件已被认为是侵犯私隐权。仔细检查，不过，汤姆逊认为，所有这些案件中，可以得到充分的，并且同样很好解释而言，对财产权的侵犯或权利的人，如一个有权不被听见。最终权，隐私权，对汤姆森的看法，仅仅是一组权利。这些权利在集群总是重叠，可以充分解释，财产权利或权利身体安全。私隐权，她认为，这是"衍生" ，在某种意义上说，有没有必要寻找什么是共同的，在集群的隐私权利。隐私权是衍生于它的重要性和理由，据汤姆逊，因为任何隐私的侵犯，是更好地理解为违反了一个更基本的权利。许多评论家提供强有力的论据，对汤姆森的批判（ scanlon ， 1975年; inness ， 1992年） 。

Probably the most famous reductionist view of privacy is one from Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975). Noting that there is little agreement on what privacy is, Thomson examines a number of cases that have been thought to be violations of the right to privacy. On closer inspection, however, Thomson believes all those cases can be adequately and equally well explained in terms of violations of property rights or rights over the person, such as a right not to be listened to. Ultimately the right to privacy, on Thomson's view, is merely a cluster of rights. Those rights in the cluster are always overlapped by, and can be fully explained by, property rights or rights to bodily security. The right to privacy, on her view, is “derivative” in the sense that there is no need to find what is common in the cluster of privacy rights. Privacy is derivative in its importance and justification, according to Thomson, as any privacy violation is better understood as the violation of a more basic right. Numerous commentators provide strong arguments against Thomson's critique (Scanlon, 1975; Inness, 1992).