Question

经济类英语翻译

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When a worker and firm negotiate a wage, there is uncertainty surrounding the value marginal product of the worker. Unknowns could include how well the skills of the worker actually match the firm’s needs and the market conditions for the workers output over the life of the contract. When the parties reach an agreement the workerreceives a fixed wage while the firm receives a lottery.9 The game is modeled as follows:0. Both parties observe 2 possible marginal revenue products denoted vH and vL where vH > vL. Both parties know that the realized value marginal product will be vH with probability p.
1. Initially, the worker asks for a wage, a, and the firm places a bid, b.
2. Nature determines if the value marginal product is vH or vL .
3. In the event that the proposals are compatible, i.e. b ≥ a, then the worker receives w = (a + b)/2 and the firm receives either vH −w or vL −w. In the event that the proposals are incompatible, the game proceeds to step 4.
4. The arbitrator’s preferred settlement is drawn from fH(·) if the value marginal product is vH and fL (·) if the value marginal product is vL. Thewage w is determined via the rules of arbitration.
Specifying fH(·) and fL (·) to be uniform distributions, Deck and Farmer (2007) show that the endpoints of the contract zone for risk neutral disputants with consistent beliefs are lower under FOA than under CA, because the median 公式A is smaller than the mean 公式B. In other words, the concatenation of these two symmetric distributions produces an asymmetric distribution over the arbitrator’s value in which the median is less than the mean. That is, with this type of uncertainty FOA systematically favors the firm even though the arbitrator is not biased. Further, as the difference between vH and vL increases holding the expected value constant the more the contract zone shifts towards lower wages. However, the contract zone for CA
is unaffected by such changes. Given that optimal behavior in AFOA is based upon the mean of the arbitrator’s distribution, the contract zone of AFOA is the same as that of CA, which are simply centered around the mean 公式B. Therefore, neither AFOA nor CA favors one party over the other when the difference between vH and vL increases holding the mean constant.

Answer 1

当一名工人和坚定的谈判工资，有不确定性的价值边际产品的工人。无名可包括如何的技能工人实际相匹配的公司的需求和市场条件，工人的生活输出合同。如果当事各方达成一项协议的workerreceives一个固定的工资，而该公司收到了lottery.9游戏模型如下： 0 。双方遵守2可能边际收益产品被命名为VH和轻链可变区地方“的VL 。双方都知道，实现边际产品价值将可变区与概率页

1 。最初，工人的工资要求的，该公司的地方出价湾

2 。性质确定是否边际产品的价值是可变区或轻。

3 。如果建议是兼容的，即b ≥ 1 ，则工作者瓦特= （一+二） / 2和坚定收到任何可变区钨或的VL -瓦特如果建议是不相容的，游戏收益步骤4 。

4 。仲裁员的首选解决取自跳频（ ）如果边际产品的价值是VH和佛罗里达州（ ）如果该值边际产品的VL 。 Thewage瓦特决心通过仲裁规则。

指定跳频（ ）和FL （ ）将统一分配，甲板和农民（ 2007年）表明，终点区的合同纠纷风险中立的一贯信念较低下福阿比晚上，因为中位数公式A是小于平均公式湾换言之，串联这两个对称分布的不对称分布产生的仲裁员的价值，其中位数少于意思。也就是说，这种类型的不确定性福阿系统有利于公司的仲裁员，即使是不怀偏见。此外，作为区别VH和举行的VL增加的预期价值不断更合同区转向更低的工资。然而，该合同区为CA

不受这种变化。鉴于最优行为AFOA是根据意味着仲裁员的分布，

Answer 2

当一个工人和坚定的谈判工资,有不确定性的边际产品的价值的工人。如何能包括未知的技能的工人却配条件和市场需求的工人的生命周期输出的合同。当双方达成协议,workerreceives固定工资时,该公司收到一lottery.9游戏建模如下:0。双方可能边际收益产品观察2表示在口腔> vH和喷枪喷枪。双方都知道,实现价值边缘产品将与概率vH p。
1。最初,职工工资,要求,该公司的地方,b。
2。如果这个值性质决定了边际产品是口腔或喷枪。
3。在这个事件中建议,即乙≥兼容,那么这个人接到了w =(+ b)/ 2和该公司收到了vH−w或喷枪或−w。在这个事件中建议不相容的情况下,比赛开始第四步。
4。仲裁员的优先解决的是来自跳·)如果值边际产品及脂肪肝(*)的口腔的边际产品价值喷枪。薪水是决定通过仲裁规则进行仲裁。
指定跳·)和外语(*)要均匀分布、甲板、农民(2007)表明,两者间的合同风险中性区和一致的信念是低一问FOA下,因为相对较小的平均公式A比平均公式B。换句话说,这两个对称分布连接不对称分布产生的仲裁员的价值,平均比平均水平。那是,这种类型的不确定性系统支持公司FOA虽不是偏见的。仲裁员而且,随着差异增加了vH和喷枪的预期值不变的举办更多的合同的区域变化对较低的工资。然而,合同区
受这样的变化。鉴于优行为在AFOA是基于平均的分布、合同的仲裁员AFOA区一样,只不过是不能公式B围绕着这个意思。因此,既不AFOA也不能支持一方的区别时,喷枪的口腔的平均增长控股不变。

Answer 3

一看就知道是翻译工具翻的 ；

当雇员和用人单位协定薪水时。。。。