Question

请求帮忙翻译一段英语文章

4.1. How Trusted Email works
The Trusted Email (TE) will have the first 6 digits to identify the card issuer. The customer will register his email with his credit card issuer. Each bank fraud department will have an account to login to the Trusted Email Server (TES) and view the history of the customer
and verify the transactions. The bank will only view the customer who has cc with them. The emails in the TES will not be deleted until the dispute time is over. All e-sites have to register an email where we only accept email from it. The TES will block any incoming emails that are not originated from a subscribed merchant system. The user will not be able to access this email account, but merchants can connect to the TES with a special client.
Figure 7 shows the steps for approval or denial when an order is placed. The customer will visit the e-commerce site (e-site). If he does not have a Trusted Email, the customer needs to register one and inform his credit card issuer of this email. If he has a Trusted
Email (TE), he can proceed and place the order, which will be subject to full address verification (FAVS) which includes Trusted Email verification, in addition to the traditional AVS. If the verification failed, the customer will be notified and his order will be verified one more time only. Repeated denied transactions will be black listed, to avoid infinite looping for FAVS step.
5. Discussion
Some will argue that fraud committer can obtain the email password, or can sniff unsecured email contents, which results in the customer paying the price for the fraud, instead of the merchants or the credit card issuers. This argument can be true with any solution, say the
fraud committer got access to your physical mailbox, or he obtained your Verified by Visa password! There are no silver bullet solutions. Our proposed solution is much superior than any current system that uses billing address or other codes for verification. This solution is easier to implement than credit card secret codes or having a surrogate credit card number. The solution has none of the common drawbacks of other proposed solutions [8], such as altering current e-commerce sites checkout procedures (as in Verified by Visa), requiring customers to download (as in MasterCard or Discover), or changing the systems of existing credit card numbers (as in surrogate numbers).
The best solution to prevent credit card fraud transactions is the one that can be implemented with minimum cost, requires minimum changes for all parties (customers, merchants, and credit card companies/banks), and has incentive for all parties to participate. We will discuss our solution’s implementation details and comparison with other solutions in future papers.

我暂时只有这点分数
但是我有分了可以追加,或者QB答谢
不要这种GOOGLG翻译直接来的阿

Answer 1

4.1 。如何信任电邮工程
信任的电子邮件（电子）将前6位数字，以确定发卡。客户将自己的电子邮件注册，他的信用卡发卡行。每家银行欺诈部将有一个帐户登录到受信任的邮件服务器（工商业污水附加费） ，并认为历史上的客户
并核实交易。该银行将只查看客户谁也抄送他们。电子邮件中的工商业污水附加费不会被删除，直到争端时间已经过去了。所有的电子网站上注册一个电子邮件，我们只接受电子邮件从它。工商业污水附加费将阻止任何传入的电子邮件，没有来自认购商户系统。用户将无法访问该电子邮件帐户，但商家可以连接到工商业污水附加费，经特殊的客户。
图7显示的步骤进行批准或拒绝的命令时，放置。客户将访问电子商务网站（电子商务网站） 。如果他没有信任的电子邮件，客户的需求进行登记，并通知他的信用卡发卡行的此电子邮件。如果他有一个信任
电子邮件（电子） ，他可以继续和地点的命令，这将受到完整的地址验证（ FAVS ） ，其中包括受信任的电子邮件验证，除了传统的AVS标准。如果验证失败，用户将得到通知，他为了将更多的时间验证一个只。一再否认黑色交易将上市，以避免无限循环的FAVS的一步。
5 。讨论
有些人可能会争辩说，欺诈committer可以得到密码的电子邮件，也可嗅出无担保的电子邮件内容，导致客户支付的价格欺诈行为，而不是商人或信用卡发卡银行。这一论点可以与任何真正的解决办法，说，
欺诈committer了访问您的身体邮箱，或他获得您的Visa验证密码！没有银弹的解决办法。我们提出的解决方案是许多优于任何现有系统，使用的帐单地址或其他代码的核查。这个解决方案易于实施比信用卡密码或有替代的信用卡号码。该解决方案也没有共同的缺点其他提议的解决办法[ 8 ] ，如改变目前的电子商务网站结帐程序（如Visa验证） ，需要用户下载（如万事达卡或发现） ，或改变系统现有的信用卡号码（如代理号码） 。
最好的解决办法，以防止信用卡欺诈交易是一个可以执行的最低成本，最少的变化，需要所有各方（客户，商户和信用卡公司/银行） ，并鼓励所有各方参加。我们将讨论我们的解决方案的实施细则和其他解决方案相比，在今后的文件。