Question

求翻译~~~英翻中

Expanding on these insightful findings, we
examine two related issues that need to be further explored. First, as noted above, the growth of China’s private sector has been the result of both privatization of public enterprises and gradual relaxation of government restrictions on genetically private economic entities. What accounts for the latter? Second, given their
clear and strong market orientation in the early years of reform, what has rendered local public enterprises like TVEs so vulnerable that they could no longer survive in an improved institutional
environment for markets? We argue that investigating the internal contradictions
generated by the dynamics of TVEs’
development holds a key to addressing these
questions. The gist of our analysis is that while the fiscal revenue sharing system introduced in the early years of reform provided exceptionally strong incentives for local officials to develop the economies under their jurisdiction, it
failed to align cadres’ interests with the goal of profit maximization, as would be the case under private ownership. Instead, the new fiscal incentive system tied the career and financial interests of local officials to various broad
development gauges such as employment, fiscal revenue, and per capita income or output growth. Second, the new revenue sharing system was structured in such a way that the fiscal autonomy of the local state depended crucially on revenues generated from sales (transaction) tax, a design that ‘‘skewed’’ local officials to
maximizing sales rather than profit growth,
which for more than a decade was made possible by easy access to bank loans. As market opportunities became more fully exploited and credit policies tightened—partly due to banking reforms in the 1990s, ‘‘super-normal’’ sales margin became unsustainable. This handicapped
the capacity of TVEs to generate both
fiscal revenues and local off-farm employment. A point was eventually reached where the marginal fiscal revenue obtained from further enterprise expansion simply failed to justify the effort to do so.

Answer 1

扩大的结果,我们在这些洞察力

检查两个相关的问题需要进一步发掘。首先,如上所述,中国经济的增长的私营部门已经导致公共事业民营化都逐渐放松政府的限制关于基因民营经济实体。是什么造就了后者?第二,因为其

清晰、强力的市场定位在早期的改革,已经超过当地的公共企业同样喜欢这么脆弱,他们可能不再生存在一种改进的制度

环境市场?我们认为,调查的内在矛盾

同样,所产生的动力学的”

拥有关键发展应对这些

问题。我们分析的要点是,虽然财政收益共享系统介绍了在早期的改革提供了特别极大的刺激当地官员发展经济,其管辖

失败了,使干部的利益与利润最大化的目标,也会出现这样的情况在私有制基础上的。相反,新形势下财政激励制度把事业和经济利益的不同地方官员的广阔

发展就业等仪表、财政收入,人均收入和产出增长。其次,新的收入共享系统的构架,在这种情况下财政自治权的局部状态的产生收入取决于在至关重要的销售(交易)税,这种设计,“偏斜"当地官员

卖出而不是最大化利润的增长,

这十多年来得以很容易地接触到银行贷款。随着市场的机会变得更充分的开拓和信贷政策tightened-partly由于银行业改革在20世纪90年代,“super-normal”的销售利润变得不可持续的。这个残疾人

同样的能力产生两个

财政收入和当地打工就业。最终达成了一分是当边际财政收入取得进一步企业扩张都未能证明了我们的努力。