Question

求助专业人士！经济类英文文献手工翻译！十万分感谢！！

Conclusion
A structural empirical test of market conduct found statistically and economically significant market power among a sample of 44 credit card banks, consistent with previous reports of high accounting profitability and with the anticompetitive interpretation of sticky credit card interest rates (Calem and Mester 1995). However, the evidence did not indicate that the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988 measurably improved the degree of competition, despite the stated purpose of the Act. These results could be explained if imperfect disclosure was not a contributing factor to the observed market power, if the disclosure requirements failed in their purpose of adequately enhancing the information available to consumers, or if extraneous events offset any pro-competitive effects of the disclosure law.
There are at least three objections to the third hypothesis. First, the model here corrected for the more stringent capital requirement introduced in the late 1980s, which was perhaps the most dramatic other shift around that period. Second. the model is structured such that the estimated conduct parameters will not be affected by intertemporal shifts in the cost function of the sort analyzed by Hunter and Timme (1986) and others. Finally, other studies of shifts in conduct among all United States banks have not found evidence of an anticome petitive shift in the late 1980s (Shaffer 1996), so the alternative hypothesis above would require that any offsetting factors must have applied only to credit card banks and not to other banks. There appear to be no obvious candidates for such factors.
算了。。这篇我放弃了。。换一篇翻。。不用麻烦大家了。。。

Answer 1

难度这么大！！！ 我明天也要交一份翻译作业，唉！悲剧。不过比你这个简单。珍重，童鞋。。。

追问

额。。我要被逼死了。。

Answer 2

结论
　　结构的实证检验市场行为和经济上的重大发现统计样本,市场力量在44信用卡的银行,与以前的报道相一致的会计利润和高粘反竞争性的解释Calem信用卡利率和Mester(1995年)。然而,这些证据并未指出,这次展会信贷和信用卡信息披露行为改善的程度,1988年它们之后,尽管竞争所陈述的目的的条例。这些结果都可以解释如果不完善信息披露并不是一个促成因素观测的市场优势,如果披露要求充分竞争中失败了的目的提高资料提供给消费者,或如果外部的事件抵消任何有利竞争效应披露信息的法律。
　　至少有三个反对第三假说。首先,该模型在这里得到纠正了更严格的资本要求在1980年代末期,这也许是最具戏剧性的转变,其他周围的时期。第二。该模型结构进行参数估计的,这样就不会被影响跨时转移成本函数的排序分析猎人”和《(1986)和其他人。最后,其他的研究对于行为的变化在所有美国银行还没有找到的证据anticome petitive转移在80年代后期(·谢弗1996年),所以替代假说以上会要求任何抵消因素必须有只适用于信用卡的银行,而不是其他银行。似乎没有什么明显的候选人为这样的因素。
最后,信用卡贷款人可能依赖于一种动态的执法机制来维持一定程度的共谋大业。尽管许多理论文献主要集中在动态实施机制的可持续性联合垄断价格(例如,弗里德曼1971年),有些模特(如Rotemberg和Saloner 1986)预测的一种模式countercyclical加价部分相互勾结,可以符合观测的粘性的信用卡利率。传统的structure-conduct-performance范式之间不会预测市场力量的信用卡,因为高度采用结构的银行业与全国范围的地域市场对银行的信用卡。
翻译只供参考