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帮我翻译这篇文字，重谢！PanelAshowstheresultswhengroupaffiliationisdefinedatthe20percentlevelofco...
帮我翻译这篇文字，重谢！
Panel A shows the results when group affiliation is defined at the 20 percent level of
control. All the regressions show that dividend rates are related positively to group affiliation and
negatively to the variable O/C*Group, i.e., the ratio of the controlling shareholder’s ownership to
control rights multiplied by the group dummy. The coefficients of both these variables are
significant for three out of the four regressions, namely, for dividends as a ratio of cash flows,Thus, Table 4B’s significantly higher overall rates of dividend for corporations affiliated to a
group at the 20 percent level must be driven by corporations with O/C < 1; at the 10 percent
level they must be driven by corporations with O/C = 1. This can be confirmed from Table 5’s
t statistics for the difference in the dividends implied by group affiliation at the 20 percent and
10 percent levels for the cases where O/C < 1 and where O/C = 1.earnings and market capitalization. However, Panel B shows that when group affiliation is
defined at the 10 percent level of control, then the coefficient on the group dummy becomes
negative and the coefficients on the group dummy and the variable O/C*Group are not
significant. Thus, within groups that are tightly controlled at the 20 percent level, we have
evidence that corporate managers must pay higher dividends to offset greater investor concerns
about expropriation when the O/C ratio is lower; we have no such evidence for the broader range
of corporations affiliated at the 10 percent level. We conclude that there is a significant difference
between the dividend behavior of corporations that are group-affiliated at the 20 percent level and
those that are affiliated at the 10 percent level, but not at the 20 percent level. This is difference is
addressed next. 展开
Panel A shows the results when group affiliation is defined at the 20 percent level of
control. All the regressions show that dividend rates are related positively to group affiliation and
negatively to the variable O/C*Group, i.e., the ratio of the controlling shareholder’s ownership to
control rights multiplied by the group dummy. The coefficients of both these variables are
significant for three out of the four regressions, namely, for dividends as a ratio of cash flows,Thus, Table 4B’s significantly higher overall rates of dividend for corporations affiliated to a
group at the 20 percent level must be driven by corporations with O/C < 1; at the 10 percent
level they must be driven by corporations with O/C = 1. This can be confirmed from Table 5’s
t statistics for the difference in the dividends implied by group affiliation at the 20 percent and
10 percent levels for the cases where O/C < 1 and where O/C = 1.earnings and market capitalization. However, Panel B shows that when group affiliation is
defined at the 10 percent level of control, then the coefficient on the group dummy becomes
negative and the coefficients on the group dummy and the variable O/C*Group are not
significant. Thus, within groups that are tightly controlled at the 20 percent level, we have
evidence that corporate managers must pay higher dividends to offset greater investor concerns
about expropriation when the O/C ratio is lower; we have no such evidence for the broader range
of corporations affiliated at the 10 percent level. We conclude that there is a significant difference
between the dividend behavior of corporations that are group-affiliated at the 20 percent level and
those that are affiliated at the 10 percent level, but not at the 20 percent level. This is difference is
addressed next. 展开
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