Question

论文急用，求英语高手帮帮忙翻译一下，多谢！！！

Equation (5) contains three decision variables: P1, CM1, and xl. When CLI~I differs only
slightly from （XoCLF.O）, an official might set xl at unity as long as he or she has a strong sense of honor. However, when CLF becomes large relative to fund reserves R~, politician may interfere in agency planning. By constraining the agency's budget for monitoring and insolvency-resolution activities, politicians can postpone politically tough decisions indefinitely, thereby protecting their own careers and allowing them to milk troubled
constituents and industry political action committees for years of donations. Congressional
and Presidential restraints on adjustments raise the career costs of truth-telling.
To clarify incentives for information suppression, it is convenient to assume that rl, rp, and R stay the same over an official's period in office and to neglect the possibility of delivering distributional boons to prospective employers. Assuming that political pressures preclude meaningful adjustments in P and （CM）

Answer 1

方程（ 5 ）包含三个决定因素：小一， CM1 ，和XL 。当不同的CLI 〜余只
略有（ XoCLF.O ） ，正式成立仪可以在团结，只要他或她具有很强的荣誉感。然而，当CLF成为相对较大的资金储备R 〜 ，政治不得干预机构规划。通过限制机构的预算监督和破产决议的活动，政治家可以推迟政治艰难的决定无限期，从而保护自己的职业生涯，并允许他们牛奶困境
成分和行业的政治行动委员会的多年的捐款。国会
和总统的限制调整提高职业费用说明真相。
为了澄清奖励提供信息，这是方便假设北京，反相，和R保持不变，超过了官方的任期和忽视的可能性，提供分配boons向未来的雇主。假设有意义的政治压力，排除调整P和（厘米）