Question

求高手帮忙翻译一段文章~~~非常感谢~！~~2

Since countries have been unable to reach a global agreement in agriculture,
capturing multiple equilibriums by means of the more general network model
provides a better understanding of the reasons explaining this lack of trade
liberalization. Second, most of the related academic works have studied the
incentives of countries to tariffs on third countries. However, these works
take as given a fixed trading structure (see, for instance, Bond et al. 2004 and
Baldwin 1999). It is for this reason that it is not possible to generalize the
incentives of countries to sign bilateral agreements for any trading structure
from these works. As a consequence, they cannot be used to determine
whether bilateralism could lead to agricultural global free trade. Third, most
of the research conducted to study agricultural trade liberalization has been
focused on the welfare trade liberalization effect (see, for instance, Devadoss
2006). However, little work has been made to analyze the stability of different
free-trade structures which is crucial for the analysis of the feasibility of a
global agreement in agriculture. Finally, because the network model assumes
oligopolistic international markets, this framework is suitable to study international
trade in agriculture as market power in this sector has been recognized
and supported by different researchers. There are two arguments explaining
the existence of market power in agriculture. One of them postulates that the
industrialization of agricultural markets has generated larger firms that are
more tightly aligned across the production chain and more concentrated due
to larger scale. According to Boehlje and Doering (2000), this concentration
can be sufficient to exercise oligopolistic power. This has also been identified
by McCorriston (2002) who found evidence of market power of food retailers
in many European countries, and Lloyd et al. (2006) who found evidence
of market power in the UK beef chain. The other argument postulates that
exporters and importers compete in oligopolistic markets because they trade
large amounts of agricultural commodities (see Reimer and Stiegert 2006). For
example, Canada and the US are important world’s major wheat exporters.
不要电脑翻译的~~太乱了~~ 回答得好我追加分数~~谢谢~~

Answer 1

因为许多国家不能就全球农贸自由化达成一致意见，没有一种宏观的网络模式来为解释贸易自由化缺失提供更好地理由，从而达到多项平衡。第二，许多相关的学术研究了这些国家对于第三世界国家的关税问题，但是这些研究成果是来源于基于一种固定的贸易模式（见Bond 2002和Baldwin1999）。就是这个原因，想要统一这些国家的利益来签署双边贸易协定是不可能的。结果，它们也就不能用于决定双边主义能否为农产品贸易自由化带来进展。第三，那些用来研究农贸自由的调查都着重于农贸自由化所产生的福利（见Devadoss2006）。然而，几乎少有研究来用于解释不同自由贸易结构的稳定性，这对于分析一个全球贸易协定的可行性是至关重要的。最后，因为这个网络模式假定的一种国际寡头垄断市场，这一结构很适于研究农产品国际贸易，因为这一区域的市场势力被不同调查者所掌控。就解释农业中市场力量的存在有两种观点。一种假定的是农贸市场的工业化使得出现一些大公司，他们通过产品链更紧密的结盟，通过大规模订单更加集中。根据Boehlje和Doering2000,这一集中更易导致寡头垄断。这一观点也分别被发现了在许多欧洲国家食物零售商中和英国牛肉链中存在市场势力的Mccorriston(2000)和Lloyd et al.(2006)所认同。另一种观点认为进口商和出口商在寡头垄断市场里德竞争导致的，因为他们交易大量的农贸产品（见Reimer和Stiegert2006）。例如加拿大和美国是世界两大主要小麦出口国。

Answer 2

2006)。 然而,太少的研究工作已经以不同的稳定性分析
自由贸易结构,至关重要的分子途径的可行性分析
全球协议在农业生产上。最后,由于网络模型假设
国际市场上,这个框架以寡占市场适合学习国际
农业贸易市场力量在这方面获得了公认
不同的研究者和支持。有两个参数解释
电力市场中存在的农业。其中一个假定
农业产业化市场产生了更大的公司
在更紧密地和更集中生产链条的原因
到更大的规模。根据Boehlje和Doering(2000),该集中
能充分行使寡占型的力量。这也被证实
通过McCorriston(2002人)发现了证据的市场力的食品零售商
在许多欧洲国家,和劳埃德吴昱。(2006人)发现了证据
在英国的市场力的牛肉链。其他参数设定