Question

大家好 求翻译 审计相关英翻中 请勿机翻6

The two-tier structure relates to the presence of both a
management board and a supervisory board. The latter has responsibility to both oversee the
former and to hire the independent statutory audit firm, which reports to the supervisory board.
As Gietzmann and Quick (1998) discuss, it is common for bank representatives on supervisory
boards to play a dominant, proactive role in corporate governance. Such a role emerges, in large
part, because German banks both act as ‘universal’ banks (i.e., they function as both commercial
and investment banks) and often hold substantial ownership. If auditing serves as a monitoring
device to mitigate conflicts of interest (Watts and Zimmerman 1983), it follows that in countries
where the monitoring of management is already high that the demand for a high-quality auditor
should be lower. Owing to alternative monitoring mechanisms, independent audits of public
companies are arguably less important in Germany. Because of this, investors are less likely to
place as much reliance on audit reports and auditors are less likely subject to dismissal when
their reputation becomes tarnished. This should inflict a bias against finding stock market or
market-share evidence supportive of a reputation rationale for high-quality auditing.

Answer 1

双层结构联系的是一个管理层与和一个监督层。后者负责监督前者以及对雇佣独立法定审计事务所负监督责任，
对监督层报告。
像杰特兹曼与奎克(1998) 讨论的那样，在监督层的银行代表扮演一个举足轻重的角色是很普遍的，
在公司管理层中起到主动的作用。这样一个角色表明，在很大程度，因为德国银行也扮演着 ‘国际性’银行的角色(举例, 他们既是商业银行也是投资银行) ，
而且通常把持着实际的所有权。如果审计服务是作为一种监督手段去减轻利益冲突 (瓦茨与兹莫曼 1983)，
在这样的国家往往就是管理的监控度已经很高了所以要求高质量的审计
应该就会低一些。由于选择监督机构，公共公司的独立审计在德国可以被认为不重要。因为如此，投资者不太喜欢去相信审计报告
而审计人员也通常不被信赖，当他们的声誉有的污点时。这个产生偏向冲击违反发现股票市场或者
市场份额明显是高质量审计的声誉原理 。

Answer 2

两层结构与a出现关连
management委员会和一个监督理事会。 后者安排责任对两个监督
former和聘用独立法律审计企业，向监督理事会报告。
As Gietzmann和Quick (1998)谈论，它为在监督的银行代表是共同的 扮演一个统治，前摄角色的boards在公司管理方法。 这样角色在大涌现，
part，因为德语开户两作为‘universal’开户(即，他们功能作为两商业
and投资银行)和经常举行坚固归属。 如果验核担当监视 缓和利益冲突的device (瓦特和Zimmerman 1983)，它在国家跟随那
where对一位优质审计员的需求管理的监视已经高
should是更低的。 由于供选择的监视机制，公众独立审计
companies可论证地是较不重要的在德国。 因此，投资者是很少可能的
place同样多对审计报告的信赖和审计员是很少可能的受解雇支配，当
their名誉变得失去光泽。 这应该给予偏心反对发现股市或
market-share证据支援优质验核的名誉理论基础